BVPSMS: A batch verification protocol for end-to-end secure SMS for mobile users by Saxena, Neetesh et al.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXXX 2017 1
BVPSMS: A Batch Verification Protocol for
End-to-End Secure SMS for Mobile Users
Neetesh Saxena Member, IEEE, Hong Shen Member, IEEE, Nikos Komninos Member, IEEE, Kim-Kwang
Raymond Choo Senior Member, IEEE, and Narendra S. Chaudhari Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Short Message Service (SMS) is a widely used communication medium for mobile applications, such as banking, social
networking, and e-commerce. Applications of SMS services also include real-time broadcasting messages, such as notification of
natural disasters (e.g., bushfires and hurricane) and terrorist attacks, and sharing the current whereabouts to other users, such as
notifying urgent business meeting information, transmitting quick information in the battlefield to multiple users, notifying current
location to our friends and sharing market information. However, traditional SMS is not designed with security in mind (e.g., messages
are not securely sent). It is also possible to extract international mobile subscriber identity of the mobile user. In the literature, there is
no known protocol that could enable secure transmission of SMS from one user to multiple users simultaneously. In this paper, we
introduce a batch verification authentication and key agreement protocol, BVPSMS, which provides end-to-end message security over
an insecure communication channel between different mobile subscribers. Specifically, the proposed protocol securely transmits SMS
from one mobile user to multiple users simultaneously. The reliability of the protocol is discussed along with an algorithm to detect
malicious user request in a batch. We then evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of communication and
computation overheads, protocol execution time, and batch and re-batch verification times. The impacts of the user mobility, and the
time, space and cost complexity analysis are also discussed. We then present a formal security proof of the proposed protocol. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first provably-secure batch verification protocol that delivers end-to-end SMS security using
symmetric keys.
Index Terms—Authentication, Batch Verification, Mobile Subscriber, SMS, Symmetric Key Cryptosystem.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
C ELLULAR and mobile telecommunication industries areone of the fastest growing industries globally, partly
due to the capability to provide a wide range of services to
the Mobile Subscribers (MSs), such as health surveillance
[1], health financing and health worker performance [2],
Short Message Service (SMS)-based web search [3] and end-
to-end communications [4], [5]. However, the challenge for
the server to handle multiple authentication requests at one
time or in a very short time period (e.g., during the first few
minutes of a major incident, such as a natural disaster or
terrorist attack) is an area that has attracted the attention of
researchers in recent years.
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1.1 Research Problem
When an SMS is sent from one MS to another, the infor-
mation contained in the SMS is transmitted as plaintext
[6]. SMS may also contain confidential information such as
PIN number and a link to a login page. Transmission of
such confidential information as plaintext over an insecure
network can be targeted by an adversary (e.g., intercepting,
reading and modifying the SMS before it reaches the SMS-
Center (SMSC) [7], [8]. Traditional SMS service does not
have a mechanism to transmit the message securely from
one MS to another MS or to a group of MSs. The EasySMS
[9] and SmartSMS [10] are the only available protocols
in the literature that enable secure transmission of SMS
from one MS to another [9]. However, no such protocol
exists in the literature that can securely delivers an SMS to
multiple recipients simultaneously. This is surprising, as in
our increasingly interconnected society, there are a number
of situations where secure transmission of batch SMS can
play a crucial role, such as sending urgent business meeting
information to two or more employees or to the members of
the political parties, military services like simultaneous and
quick transmission of secure information in the battlefield,
notifying current location to our friends or family members
when a person is in trouble, sharing market information,
crowd-sourcing information, human flesh search engine of
notifying other users about a corrupted public servant by
secure SMS, and in some cases life-saving (e.g., notifying
residents in remote areas of a fast spreading bushfire, an
earthquake or a volcano eruption, or notifying all residents
and users in the vicinity of an area to stay indoor due to
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an ongoing terrorist attack). In many of these applications,
we should not compromise on security for the capability for
batch dissemination of SMS. For example, without an end-
to-end (batch) SMS security mechanism in place, a malicious
attacker could hijack and replace a batch SMS from the
local authorities with one that will create social unrest (e.g.,
messages inciting racial hatred). In addition, the protocol
should be sufficiently lightweight, suitable for deployment
on resource-constrained devices (e.g., limited battery) [11].
We will address such security issues and consider them in
the system and threat models.
1.2 Existing Solutions
Several batch verification-based solutions have been de-
signed for different applications. For example, a number of
protocols have been proposed for the value added services
in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) [12], [13], [14],
public-private key-based vehicular communication system
[15], [16], [17], and digital signatures in batch to achieve high
efficiency [18], [19]. Several SMS-based wireless protocols
[20], [21], [22], [23], lightweight AKA [7] and SMS-based
attacks and their countermeasures are discussed in [8]. Also,
the protocols in [24], [25], [26], [27] are designed to provide
SMS security based on asymmetric key cryptography with
the exception in [26]. Other protocols in the literature in-
clude [28], [29] designed for the Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM), [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35] for
the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS),
and [36], [37] for the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks.
However, all these protocols do not consider simultaneous
multiple authentication requests using SMS. Group Au-
thentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocols are also
available in the LTE network [38], [39]. However, these
protocols do not consider SMS as a communication medium
and require additional cost and storage for a group setup.
Recently, a solution for user privacy in mobile telephony
was proposed using the predefined multiple International
Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI) for each Universal Sub-
scriber Identity Module (USIM) [40]. However, this solution
requires a large storage space, generates a huge overhead
for pseudo-identities, and utilizes significant bandwidth for
sending IMSIs to each MS.
The SSMS protocol [41] and the Secure Extensible and
Efficient SMS (SEESMS) protocol [42], [43] do not provide
end-to-end SMS security for mobile users, rather they pro-
vide security between a mobile user and the server, which
is just a subpart of the problem of this paper and also
was the same in EasySMS. These protocols in addition
to the protocol in [44] do not focus the communication
and computation overheads, prevention from attacks, and
the bandwidth utilization. The additional drawback with
SEESMS is that it was not suitable for resource constraint
devices like mobile phones. There are other existing proto-
cols as well for securing SMS between a mobile user and
the server: SecureSMS [45], SK-SIM [46], and SMSSec [47],
however, they do not provide SMS security between the end
users. Similarly, the VAS-AKA [48] protocol does not provide
end-to-end SMS security for mobile users, rather it secures
the communication between a mobile user and the service-
provision server in order to deliver value added services.
There are mainly two approaches of designing authen-
tication system, namely peer-to-peer approach and server-
based approach. The peer-to-peer security approach recom-
mended in [49] is based on the public key crytosystem,
which requires a public-private key pair for each user. It
does not require a central authority or a central server for
authentication, but the overall processing is relatively slow
in comparison to a symmetric key cryptosystem. On the
other hand, [50] and [51] mentioned that the Authentication
Server (AS) is a better strategy, as it provides faster pro-
cessing and supports lightweight authentication for a large
number of users. However, a single point of failure can be
an issue if there is only one AS deployed in the system. In
this paper, we selected the server-based approach for au-
thenticating user requests as it supports the existing cellular
infrastructure, where an AS is a part of the Authentication
Center (AuC).
A literature review suggests that there is no known batch
verification-based protocol that provides end-to-end SMS
security to many MS, although we observe that commer-
cially available applications, such as SMSzipper, TextSecure,
moGile Secure SMS, and CryptoSMS provide the facility to
send secure SMS. However, there are a number of limi-
tations in these software solutions, such as (i) the need to
install them on the phone’s memory/memory card, (ii) the
need to provide a secret key to the SMS recipient, and (iii)
the inability to support sending of an SMS to many users si-
multaneously. Moreover, the security of the communications
may also be affected by malware installed or vulnerabilities
on the client devices. Therefore, a preferred solution is to
develop a protocol that provides end-to-end security.
1.3 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient batch
verification-based AKA protocol, hereafter referred to as
Batch Verification Authentication and Key Agreement Pro-
tocol (BVPSMS), which enables the transmission of an SMS
to multiple recipients at any one time. The BVPSMS uses
symmetric keys, since symmetric key encryptions are sig-
nificantly faster than asymmetric key encryptions and as
shown in [52], [53], they consume less energy. The proposed
protocol has the following contributions:
1) The BVPSMS protocol:
a) provides mutual authentication between the
sender MS and the Authentication Server (AS), and
between each recipient MSi and the AS.
b) maintains message confidentiality and integrity
using AES with Counter (AES-CTR) and Message
Authentication Code (MAC), respectively, during
messages transmission over an insecure network.
c) allows the sending of only one of n-pieces of the
secret code of the key by sender MS to each recipient
MS. It has the following advantages: (i) sending a
partial code to each recipient MS improves the over-
all security of the system, and (ii) reduces the total
communication overhead generated by the protocol.
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2) Our protocol is secure against replay attack, Man-
in-the-Middle (MITM) attack, impersonation attack,
SMS disclosure, and SMS spoofing.
3) Each user’s original identity is kept secret during
the authentication over the network. It protects the
user against IMSI tracing and ID-theft attacks.
We compare our protocol with four other related pro-
tocols (ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+). In a batch
authentication when number of requests are 5, 10, 20, 50,
100, and the findings are as follows:
1) During first time (fresh) authentication, i.e.,
BVPSMS∗, reduces 6.1%, 23%, 12.5%, and 46.52%
of the communication overhead as compared to
ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+, respectively,
and is equal of the BLS protocol. However, BLS does
not provide mutual authentication, user privacy, in-
tegrity protection, and offers only partial resilience
to impersonation attack.
2) During each subsequent authentication, i.e.,
BVPSMS∗∗, lowers the communication bandwidth
by 79.27%, 89.83%, 80.69%, and 88.2% in comparison
to ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+,
respectively.
In addition, findings from the simulations (i.e. execu-
tion time, verification time, and re-batch verification time)
demonstrate the utility of our protocol in a real-world
cellular network deployment.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the system and threat models for SMS security.
Section 3 presents our proposed protocol. Section 4 presents
the reliability analysis of the proposed protocol, a malicious
request detection algorithm, and the impact on user mobil-
ity. The security analysis and the performance evaluation
of the BVPSMS protocol are presented in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively. Finally, section 7 concludes this work.
2 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
In this section, we present the system and threat models.
2.1 System Model
We introduce a scenario where the MS sends an SMS to
multiple MSs simultaneously. Upon receiving the SMS, each
MS sends its authentication request to the AS for identity
verification of the sender MS. The system model allows
many such concurrent executions (e.g., several MS send-
ing SMS to multiple recipients MS. A scenario is shown
in Figure 1 where multiple MSs send their authentication
requests to the AS for the identity verification of sender
MS at the same time. The AS handles the received au-
thentication requests and authenticates all the MSs. The
authentication request may be single or multiple. However,
it would be uncommon to have only a single request at
Sender Mobile 
User (MS)
Recipients Mobile 
User (MSi)
Authentication Server 
(AS)
(1) The MS sends SMS to 
multiple users MSi
simultaneously.
(2) All MSi send their 
requests to the AS for 
the verification.
(3) The AS
authenticates the 
sender MS and all 
recipients MSi.
(4) The sender MS
authenticates the AS.
(5) All recipients MSi
authenticate the AS.
Fig. 1: Batch authentication requests from the MS to the AS.
any point of time. When an SMS is sent from the sender
MS to the recipient MS over the 2G/3G (GSM/UMTS) net-
works, it follows the path shown in Figure 2(a) [54], [55]:
Sender MS→Base Transceiver Station (BTS)→Base Station
Controller (BSC)→Mobile Switching Center (MSC)→SMS-
Gateway MSC (SMS-GMSC)→SMS-Center (SMSC)→SMS-
GMSC→MSC→BSC→BTS→Recipient MS. Similarly, Figure
2(b) and Figure 2(c) show a path of SMS transmission over
the SGs and IP/IMS in 4G (LTE) networks. It is challenging
for the AS to verify and authenticate a large number of MSs,
based on its capacity to handle requests in an efficient way.
If the server can only handle one request at a time, then it
requires a queue to manage all incoming requests. However,
managing such a queue will result in increased overheads,
time, and cost of authentication. In fact, the approach used
for the authentication must be very efficient to handle
all the requests in a very short time. To more efficiently
handle multiple authentication requests, one solution is to
perform a batch authentication for all incoming requests.
However, there may be one or more malicious requests
generated by the adversary. In such a case, we need to first
identify the malicious requests and remove the identified
malicious requests from the batch, then perform re-batch
authentication. This comes at an additional cost to the re-
batch authentication. However, the cost of authenticating
each user is reduced. The notations used in the paper are
presented in Table 1.
2.2 Threat Model
We consider a threat model with three categories of mobile
users, namely honest majority, semi-honest majority, and
dishonest majority. In the honest majority scenario, the legit-
imate and honest MS and the AS behaves as per protocol
specifications, while a few (no more than half the total)
MS send incorrect outputs to the AS in a semi-honest MS
scenario. However, in the dishonest MS (malicious MS to the
network) scenario, majority of the MS (more than half) send
fabricated information to the AS. Furthermore, malicious
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Other 
MSC
Other BSC Other BTS Recipient MS
SMS Center 
(SMSC)
Database
SMS Gateway MSC
(SMS-GMSC)
Mobile Switching 
Center (MSC)
Base Station 
Controller (BSC)
Base Transceiver
Station (BTS)
Sender MSEquipment Identity 
Register (EIR)
Home Location 
Register (HLR)
Visiting Location 
Register (VLR)
Authentication 
Center (AuC)
(a) SMS transmission in 2G/3G (GSM/UMTS) system.
Other 
MSC
Other MME Other eNodeB Recipient UE
SMS Center 
(SMSC)
Database
SMS Gateway MSC
(SMS-GMSC)
Mobile Switching 
Center (MSC)
Mobility Management 
Entity (MME) eNodeB
Sender UEEquipment Identity 
Register (EIR)
Home Subscriber 
Server (HSS)
Visiting Location 
Register (VLR)
Authentication 
Center (AuC)
SGs Interface
(b) SMS transmission over SGs in 4G (LTE) system.
Other IP-
SM-GW
Other MME Other eNodeB Recipient UE
SMS Center 
(SMSC)
Database
IP Multimedia Subsystem 
(IMS) Multimedia Telephony 
Service (MMTel)
IP Short Message 
Gateway (IP-SM-GW)
Mobility Management 
Entity (MME) eNodeB
Sender UEEquipment Identity 
Register (EIR)
Home Subscriber 
Server (HSS)
Visiting Location 
Register (VLR)
Authentication 
Center (AuC)
SMS over IP
(SIP)
(c) SMS transmission over IP/IMS in 4G (LTE) system.
Fig. 2: SMS transmission from the sender MS/UE to receiver
MS/UE in cellular systems.
MS computes the required functions in a probabilistic poly-
nomial time with auxiliary information. We do not consider
these scenarios for the AS, as malicious AS does not have
the correct keys in its database. Therefore, we consider only
the trusted AS scenario where the AS always sends correct
information to all the MSs. We also remark that an adversary
can delay some or all the messages between the MS and the
AS under a public channel.
In this paper, we consider two variations of the ad-
versary models: non-adaptive and adaptive variations. In
a non-adaptive or static variation of the model, a set of
corrupted users are fixed, while in the adaptive variant, the
adversary can choose any corrupted users in any numbers
during run time. Furthermore, the adversary can choose any
input for corrupted users. We also consider passive as well as
active adversaries in the network.
i) Security and Privacy Attacks, and Integrity Violations:
TABLE 1: Notations
Symbol Description Size (bits)
MS Mobile station referring user –
UE User Equipment referring user –
AS Authentication server referring AuC –
IMSI International mobile subscriber identity 128
TID Temporary identity 128
ReqNo Request number 8
SK Shared secret key between MS and AS 128
DK Delegation key generated from SK 128
H/MAC Hash/message authentication code 64
T/Ti/T1 Timestamp 64
K Random number 128
Y/P/Q/R Variable 128
Z Signature generated by the MS 128
SIMcode SIM card activation code of SK key 64
S-Actcode Sender generated code of the SK key 64
Actcode Recipient generated code of the SK key 64
ExpT Expiry time 64
f1() HMACSHA-256 is used to generate DK –
f2() AES-CTR is used to generate TID –
f3() HMAC-SHA1 is used to generate MAC –
E{}DK Encryption function with DK key –
D{}DK Decryption function with DK key –
⊕ Bitwise XOR operation –
→ Right arrow –
The threat model describes different scenarios to capture
various attacks in which a malicious MS can access the
authentic information or misguide legitimate MS. Since the
SMS is sent in plaintext, network operators can eavesdrop
on the SMS content at the SMSC. This leads to SMS dis-
closure and spoofing attacks. Currently, Over-the-Air (OTA)
interface between the MS and the BTS is protected by a
weak encryption algorithm, such as A5/1 or A5/2. Hence, the
adversary can compromise the messages in order to capture
the information contained in the SMS. The unencrypted
messages are sent over the Signaling System (SS7) networks,
which does not secure the transmission medium.
ii) Security Goals: Our security goals are as follows:
1) Mutual Authentication: The proposed protocol must
provide mutual authentication between each MS
and the AS.
2) Data Confidentiality and Message Integrity: These are
two key properties to prevent the leakage or abuse
of user data.
3) Other Security Properties: The protocol should be
secured against the following attacks:
a) Eavesdropping and Impersonation Attacks: The
adversary can eavesdrop the communication
between the user and the server. The ad-
versary may also pretend itself as legitimate
user or the server and perform imperson-
ation attacks. The half-open connection re-
quests lead to flood-based Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks [56]. There are cellular network
protocols that protect the system against a
DoS attack, such as Secure-AKA in UMTS
network [57].
b) MITM Attacks: An adversary can perform
MITM attack when the MS is connected to
the BTS and eavesdrops the session initiated
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by a legitimate MS. If IMSI is sent in clear-
text, the adversary can compromise the sys-
tem/user by tracing the user. Commercially
available software, such as IMSI catcher can
be used to capture the user’s IMSI over a
weak or unencrypted network.
c) Replay Attacks: The attacker may fraudu-
lently delay the conversation between both
MS, and captures or reuses the authenticated
information contained in the previous mes-
sages to facilitate or conduct a replay attack.
4) Session Key Security, Forward Secrecy, and Non-
linkability: It is common practice not to send the
session key over the network in a plaintext. The
system must also defeat known key attacks and
maintain forward secrecy. The protocol should be
able to handle key generation, transmission, and
its usage. The adversary must not be able to link
current session information (messages and keys)
with previous sessions, i.e., non-linkability.
5) Privacy Preservation and Untraceability: The original
identity of each MS must be protected during its
transmission over the network. Such privacy preser-
vation helps to secure the system against MITM
attacks and user untreaceability.
3 PROPOSED PROTOCOL: BVPSMS
In this section, we present the proposed efficient and se-
cure batch verification-based protocol BVPSMS for end-to-
end SMS security over an insecure network. The BVPSMS
protocol is illustrated in Figure 3. The following subsections
describe our protocol in detail.
3.1 System Assumptions
We make the following assumptions, similar to the tradi-
tional cellular network, for our system implementation:
Assumption 1. An AS is deployed at the Authentication
Center (AuC) similar to the traditional cellular network.
Assumption 2. A Secret Key (SK) is stored in the AS’s
database at the AuC as well as on the Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM) card of the MS during manufacturing.
Assumption 3. The AS never discloses the stored secret keys
to any other entity in the network. Also, it does not illegally
reuse the secret key of any one mobile user to other users.
Assumption 4. The process of generating Actcode and re-
trieval of SIMcode (discussed later in user registration sub-
section) is strictly kept secret and not publicly available. This
is a realistic assumption as cellular network algorithms and
functions are generally considered intellectual property.
3.2 Definition of the Functions Used
Our protocol uses different functions with standard nota-
tions, such as f1(), f2(), f3(), and E/D{}, similar to used
by existing cellular network authentication protocols. In the
protocol, f1() and f3() functions are two different HMAC
functions to avoid any collision generated with the same
input. We also consider AES with Counter mode (AES-CTR)
to implement f2() and E/D{}. However, inputs for f2()
and E/D{} are different. Modern mobile devices are fairly
capable of computing these functions [9]. The structure of
these functions as follows:
f1() Function: A one-way function, such as one-way
hash function HMACSHA-256, which takes input message
of 512 bits with SK key and generates 256 bits of hash code,
out of which first 128 bits are used as the DK key.
f2() Function: Any reversible symmetric encryption
function, such as AES-CTR where the plaintext and shared
key generate the ciphertext, and then ciphertext and the
same key are able to produce the original plaintext. The key
used in the function is DK, derived from the SK key at MS
as well as at AS.
f3() Function: It is used to generate MAC codes, which
can be implemented by a one-way MAC function, such
as HMAC-SHA1 that takes as input a multiple of 512 bits
message with DK key and generates 160 bits of hash code,
where the first 64 bits are used as MAC.
E/D{}DK Function: It is used to encrypt and decrypt
the transmitted messages over the network. AES-CTR with
DK key is used for this purpose. The Modified AES (MAES)
[9] with 256 bits of DK key can also be used as an alternative.
However, a key expand function is required to generate 256
bits of DK key from 128 bits.
3.3 Detailed Description
Although the protocol is capable of supporting concurrent
threads of different MSs sending their authentication re-
quests with SMSs to several different MSs. For simplicity,
in this section, we present a scenario where a MS sends
multiple SMSs to different MSs. This scenario can be easily
extended with multiple sender MSs. The physical secu-
rity (any personal access by the end user/mobile opera-
tor/adversary) of the AS is assumed secure, similar to the
existing traditional cellular networks. Hence, it is almost
impossible to extract the secret key SK of a mobile user.
Readers should not confuse the AuC with the SMSC. At the
SMSC, mobile operator can easily access the content of each
message. The AuC is secured against any personal access,
and the keys stored at the AuC can only be accessed by the
protocol during its execution. Therefore, the AS is secure
against any personal access.
The proposed protocol uses a temporary identity (TID)
for each user involved in the authentication process. The
idea is to protect the user’s original identity (international
mobile subscriber identity IMSI, and not a mobile number)
over an insecure network. A mobile user can be traced by its
IMSI number. A mobile number is used just to connect with
a user, but it is never sent or exchanged over the network. In
other words, this mapping to recognize the actual user takes
place only with the IMSI number. Relevant authorities, such
as safety and security department, can trace the original user
with the help of the cellular providers, but an attacker or
other legitimate users cannot trace a user over the network
during communication.
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MS MSi AS
Generate TID1, DK1,
S-Actcodei, ReqNo, T1,
MAC11
(1) : T1,ReqNo, TID1, S-Actcodei,MAC11−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B Verifies MAC11
?
= MAC1
′
1, If yes, proceed
(2) : Message (1), Ti, TIDi,Yi,Zi,Actcodei,MAC2i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B Verifies MAC2i
?
= MAC2
′
i
Retrieves SIMcode1, DK1,
SIMcodei, DKi,
IMSI1, IMSIi
Computes P , Q, R,
Q
?
= R
(3) : E{Tm+1, ExpT}DK1C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Generates Tm+1
(4) : E{Tm+1}DK1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B Verifies Tm+1
Verifies MAC3i
?
= MAC3
′
i
(5) : E{Tm+2, ExpT, new-ReqNo, new-SIMcodei,DK1}DKi ,C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Generates Tm+2, MAC3i
Pi,MAC3iC−−−−−−−−−−
Check, If T1 is same (6) : E{new-ReqNo, new-SIMcode1, T1}DK1C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
as initial, then stop.
(a) Phase-1: protocol execution for mutual authentication.
MS MSi
(7) : new-ReqNo, E{TID1, Tj}DK1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−B Checks TID1, new-ReqNo,
(8) : E{new-ReqNoi, Tj+1}DK1C−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− If Tj ≤ ExpT, retrieves DK1
(b) Phase-2: subsequent authentications.
Fig. 3: BVPSMS protocol (a) phase-1 (b) phase-2.
We describe our protocol in four different parts: user reg-
istration, pseudo-identity generation, protocol initialization,
and protocol execution. The protocol maintains message
integrity between each MS and the AS using MACs.
1) User Registration: When a user requests for a new
SIM, the operator activates SIM card by establishing a con-
nection between the SIM card and the AS. The AS generates
a random SIMcode ∈ Z∗p (where p is a large prime), stores
SIMcode in its database as a label to the secret key SK,
and also sends SIMcode to the SIM card during first use
(e.g., when the card is activated). On receiving SIMcode, the
SIM card stores it in the memory. The Actcode is a one-time
activation code sent to the AS instead of the actual SIMcode,
when requesting for the authentication. The purpose of this
code is to help the AS to verify SIMcode and retrieve SK key
from its database that belongs to a user requesting for the
authentication. The AS sends a random new-SIMcode to all
involved MSs for subsequent authentication request.
In the proposed protocol, when a mobile user activates
this module to send an SMS to multiple users, an automatic
signal is sent to the respective AS, which sends a random
k to the user’s device encrypted by its DK key. The user
decrypts k and chooses n by its own. The selection of
n is based on the average number of SMSs dropped by
the network per unit time. Although there is no guarantee
that an SMS will actually be delivered to the recipient, but
delay or complete loss of a message is uncommon, typically
affecting less than 5 percent of messages [58]. Hence, our
scheme uses n ≤ 1.05 ×k. The generation and transmission
of activation code S-Actcode by the sender MS and retrieval
of actual SIMcode by the AS are motivated by Shamir Secret
Sharing Scheme [59] as follows:
The goal is to divide the hash of secret SIMcode of the
sender MS into n-pieces as {S-Actcode1, S-Actcode2, ..., S-
Actcodei} (i = 1, 2, ...,n) such that: (i) knowledge of at least
k pieces of S-Actcodei helps AS in the computation required
to generate the final SIMcode, say SIMcode1’s hash, and (ii)
knowledge of any k-1 pieces of S-Actcodei cannot help in the
reconstruction of the final SIMcode1’s hash (considering all
possible values are equally likely). Therefore, the sender MS
sends S-Actcodei to n-recipients MSi. All n-MSi (in the ideal
case) or at least k out of n-recipients MSi (in case of error
or network failure) forward their Actcodei to the AS along
with the received S-Actcodei (part of sender MS). The AS
obtains the actual hashed SIMcode1 after receiving at least
k-S-Actcodei. The AS will then match the computed hashed
SIMcode1 with the stored pre-computed hash of SIMcode1 of
the sender MS. Once the hashed SIMcode1 is known to the
AS, it retrieves SK1 key and derives a delegation key DK1 of
the sender MS. This entire process takes k points to define
a polynomial of degree k-1 in a finite field F of size p where
0 < k ≤ n < p, SIMcode1 < p, and p is a large prime.
The sender MS chooses at random k-1 positive integers
{b1, b2, ..., bk−1} with bi < p, and computes a polynomial
f(x) = b0+b1x+b2x
2+...+bk−1xk−1, where b0 = SIMcode1.
The sender MS generates n S-Actcodei points (xi, yi) as
(i, f(i) mod q) using the Lagrange basis polynomial, where
q > n, q > bi. On receiving the message (from at least
k-recipients MSi), the AS reconstructs a polynomial by
computing f(x) as:
f(x) =
k∑
i=1
yili(x), where li(x) =
∏
1≤j≤k
j 6=i
(x− xj)/(xi − xj).
Finally, the AS retrieves the actual SIMcode1 (= b0) from the
computed f(x). In our protocol, each recipient MSi also
generates its own Actcodei as follows:
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At the MSi: Each MSi generates Actcodei = H(SIMcodei) and
is sent to the AS. We use first 64 bits of H() function as
Actcodei, which is SHA256.
At the AS: The AS pre-computes H(SIMcodei) from the
stored SIMcodei for each MSi, and then verifies Actcodei
?
=
H(SIMcodei). Thereafter, the AS extracts SKi key and de-
rives DKi key by referring SIMcodei of each MSi. The delega-
tion keys are special keys that represent the corresponding
users and are derived from the original keys. This idea
prevents the original keys from been accessed by adver-
saries over the network. In short, the original keys cannot
be derived and comprised by the unauthorized users.
We keep the selection of k points dynamic by the AS
in each attempt to increase the difficulty of an adversary in
correctly guessing the different pieces of the secret SIMcode1.
Also, in each such request, n is randomly generated, which
is at least 1.05 × k. For example, we can divide the hash
of secret SIMcode1 into twenty parts (n = 20) of S-Actcodei,
and any fifteen parts (k = 15) can sufficiently reconstruct the
original SIMcode1. Note that the construction of SIMcode1
by an adversary is useless, as it cannot derive or extract
meaningful information from SIMcode1 and the information
sent over the network. Later, in our protocol after verifying
sender MS and all recipients MSi, the AS sends a new
new-SIMcode1 and new-SIMcodei to the MS and all MSi,
respectively, for subsequent authentication request.
2) Pseudo-Identity Generation: The generation of TID
and retrieval of IMSI are not publicly available. We consider
IMSI 128-bit as defined in the 3GPP specifications [60],
according to which the length of the compressed IMSI
and encrypted IMSI shall be 64 bits (8 octets) and 128
bits (16 octets), respectively. We use an encryption func-
tion to generate a temporary identity of each participat-
ing user. Each MSi (including sender MS) computes TIDi
as TIDi = f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi to prevent the transmission
of the original IMSIi over the network that protects ID-
theft, eavesdropping, and MITM attacks. Here, Ti is the
current timestamp, DKi is a delegation key, and f2() is a
reversible symmetric encryption function (e.g., AES-CTR).
The structure of this function may be known; however, DKi
key remains secret.
3. Protocol Initialization: Let m be the total number of
authentication requests generated by various mobile users
MSi (where i = 2, 3, ..., m+1) to the AS at the same time
when they receive a request from the sender MS. Initially,
each MSi (and sender MS) chooses a random number
Ki ∈ Z∗p (where p is a large prime integer of 128 bits),
generates current timestamp Ti, and derives a delegation
key DKi, where DKi = f1(Ti)SKi and f1() is a hash-
based MAC function, such as HMACSHA-256. Thereafter,
each MSi computes Yi = Ki ⊕ IMSIi and a symmetric-
signature Zi = (Ki + DKi ⊕ ReqNo) mod m, where ⊕ is a
bitwise XOR operation. Each mobile user generates a valid
symmetric-signature and fulfills the security properties with
Assumption 3, such as authenticity (the signer itself signs
the associated message with its key), unforgeability (only
the signer can generate a valid symmetric-signature for the
associated message, assuming an honest AS), non-reusability
(generated symmetric-signature cannot be reused), non-
repudiation (signer cannot deny the signing of a message,
i.e., symmetric-signature, with a honest AS), and integrity
(ensures that content has not been modified). Note that in
symmetric key cryptography, both parties know the shared
secret key. If they send messages to a third party, then it
is difficult to determine the sender of the message received
by a third party. In such a scenario, only two parties are
involved. In other words, only the MSi (and sender MS)
and the AS know the corresponding SKi key as well as the
generated DKi key.
4. Protocol Execution: This phase proceeds the execu-
tion of the proposed protocol in two parts: a fresh batch
authentication and the subsequent authentications. A batch
authentication process verifies the identites of the sender
and all receiver MS simultaneously. If a batch process
contains malicious MS and does not successfully verifies
the identities of all users, a re-batch authentication will be
performed after detecting the malicious users in the batch.
Once a batch authentication is successful, the verified sender
and receiver users can directly communicate with each other
using a delegation key with a specified expiry time.
Phase-1: Batch Authentication: The proposed protocol
performs the following six steps for a batch authentication:
Step 1. [MS→ MSi: T1, ReqNo, TID1, S-Actcodei, MAC11]:
The sender MS sends its request as {timestamp T1, Re-
qNo, temporary identity TID1, activation code S-Actcodei,
MAC11}, where MAC11 = f3(T1,ReqNo,TID1, S-Actcodei)
to all targeted MSi (message-1), where f3() is a hash-based
MAC function, such as HMAC-SHA1.
Step 2. [MSi → AS: T1, ReqNo, TID1, S-Actcodei, MAC11,
Actcodei, TIDi, Ti, Yi, Zi, MAC2i]: On receiving the
request, all recipients MSi compute MAC1
′
1 and verify
MAC11
?
= MAC1
′
1. If it verifies, then the respective
MSi proceeds; otherwise, the connection is terminated by
the MSi. The MSi who successfully verify MAC11, com-
pute and send their activation codes Actcodei, temporary
identity TIDi, timestamps Ti, variables Yi and Zi, and
MAC2i to the AS along with message-1 received from the
MS except MAC11 (message-2), where MAC2i = f3(T1,
ReqNo,TID1, S-Actcodei, Ti,TIDi, Yi, Zi, Actcodei).
Step 3. [AS → MS: E{Tm+1,ExpT}DK1 ]: On receiving the
message, the AS computes MAC2
′
i for all the received mes-
sages from different MSi and compares MAC2i
?
= MAC2
′
i. If
the verification returns false, the AS terminates the connec-
tion for the MSi. Otherwise, the AS extracts the hashed SIM-
codei and computes DKi key (from the respective Actcodei
and SKi) and IMSIi = f2(TIDi, Ti)DKi (from the received
TIDi) for all valid MSi. The AS also computes the hashed
SIMcode1, extracts SK1 key, derives DK1 key and retrieves
IMSI1. Thereafter, the AS computes Pi = (DKi ⊕ IMSIi),
P =
∑m
i=1(Pi), R =
∑m
i=1(Zi ⊕ IMSIi)− (ReqNo⊕ P ) and
Q =
∑m
i=1(Yi). If (Q
?
= R) is true at the AS, all MSi are
successfully verified by the AS. Otherwise, one or more MSi
are malicious, which requires a re-batch authentication.
Re-batch Authentication Process: In a re-batch
authentication, the AS finds all invalid MSi using a
detection algorithm “Malicious Requests Detection”
(discussed in Section 4) and removes all invalid MSi
from the batch. After removing malicious MSi from a
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batch, the AS re-computes P =
∑m−t
i=1 (DKi ⊕ IMSIi) and
R =
∑m−t
i=1 (Zi ⊕ IMSIi) − (ReqNo ⊕ P ), where t is the
total number of malicious MSi. Thereafter, the AS compares∑m−t
i=1 (Yi
?
= R), and ensures that all legitimate MSi are
authenticated. Finally, the AS sends E{Tm+1,ExpT}DK1
to the sender MS (message-3), where new-ReqNo is a new
request number assigned by the AS for subsequent request.
Step 4. [MS → AS: E{Tm+1}DK1 ]: The MS replies
E{Tm+1}DK1 as an acknowledgment to the AS (message-4).
Step 5. [AS → MSi: Pi, E{Tm+2, new-ReqNo,ExpT,
new-SIMcodei,DK1}DKi , MAC3i]: The AS decrypts
the message as D{E{Tm+1}DK1}DK1 and verifies Tm+1.
Furthermore, the AS sends all Pi to the respective MSi along
with {E{Tm+2, new-ReqNo, new-SIMcodei,ExpT,DK1}DKi ,
MAC3i} (message-5), where MAC3i = f3(Pi,
E{Tm+2, new-ReqNo, new-SIMcodei,ExpT,DK1}DKi). On
receiving the message, all MSi compute MAC3
′
i and
compare MAC3i
?
= MAC3
′
i. If it holds, all MSi compute
P
′
i and compare Pi
?
= P
′
i , where P
′
i = (DKi ⊕ IMSIi). If
the verification returns true, the AS is verified by all MSi.
Otherwise, the particular MSi terminates the connection.
Step 6. [AS→MS: E{T1, new-ReqNo, new-SIMcode1}DK1 ]:
Finally, the AS sends E{T1, new-ReqNo, new-SIMcode1}DK1
to the MS (message-6), where T1 (first timestamp) shows the
completion of authentication process. Thereafter, endpoints
can communicate with secure messages encrypted by
AES-CTR with 128 bits key.
Phase-2: Subsequent Authentications: Any subsequent
request made by sender MS within a pre-determined expiry
time of DK1 executes as follows:
Step 7. [MS→ MSi: new-ReqNo, E{TID1, Tj}DK1 ]: The MS
sends {new-ReqNo, E{TID1, Tj}DK1} to all respective MSi
(message-7).
Step 8. [MSi → MS: E{new-ReqNoi, Tj+1}DK1 ]: All MSi
check new-ReqNo, retrieve the corresponding DK1 from their
memory, and decrypt the received message. Furthermore,
if Tj ≤ ExpT, all respective MSi compute another request
number new-ReqNoi = f3(new-ReqNo,TID1, Tj) and sends
it to the MS along with Tj+1 (message-8). The same new-
ReqNoi is computed by each MSi. However, Tj+1 is different
for each MSi. Thereafter, the MS retrieves the message and
stores new-ReqNoi in its memory for the subsequent request.
4 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the reliability of the BVPSMS
protocol, an algorithm to detect malicious requests, and the
impact of user mobility [14], [48].
Proposition 1. Hypergeometric distribution probability helps
to predict malicious requests in a batch and determines the
reliability of the proposed protocol.
If we can determine the approximate number of ma-
licious user requests involved in the process, Hypergeo-
metric distribution probability can help us determining the
probability in detecting malicious requests in our system.
Deploying an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), such as the
one presented in [61] in the cellular network, can identify the
suspicious malicious users. Let NMS be the maximum num-
ber of authentication requests generated by mobile users
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Fig. 4: Reliability analysis of our protocol when t = [1-10].
at any point of time. Realistically, some of these requests
may be malicious, denoted as NIN. Also, we assume that
NAS is the maximum capacity of the AS to authenticate
requests at any point of time. For the statistical analysis,
we assume that NMS = 100, NAS = 50, and NIN = 10% of the
NMS, i.e., 10. Let Prob{t} is the probability when t malicious
authentication requests are sent to the AS. The probability
of Hypergeometric distribution [62] is as follows:
Prob{t} =
(NMS−NIN
NAS−t
)(NIN
t
)(NMS
NAS
) , where t = 1, 2, ..., 10.
This indicates that (NAS − t) valid requests are sent
out of (NMS − NIN). Figure 4 shows the probability of
Hypergeometric distribution when NMS = 100, NAS = 50,
NIN = 10, and malicious requests are t = 1, 2, 3, ..., 10.
This probability is maximum (0.25) for t = 5 (half of t), and
minimum (0.00059) for t = 10 (last of t values).
Proposition 2. There exists an algorithm that detects mali-
cious requests in a batch.
In practice, few of the mobile participants may be dis-
honest or malicious. A dishonest mobile participant will
always lie about the true secret value. Our scheme assumes
that all shares lie on a single polynomial of degree at most k-
1. This might not hold if the sender mobile user is dishonest
Algorithm 1 Malicious Requests Detection
Input: The AS receives a set (AR) of m-authentication
requests (Ri) as AR = {R1, R2, R3, ..., Rm} at any time.
Output: Returns a set of malicious requests (MR), other-
wise returns True.
if (batch verification (AR, m) == 1) then returns True.
else
while (batch verification (AR, m) != 1) do
AR1 = {R1, R2, R3, ..., Rdm/2e};
AR2 = {Rdm/2e+1, Rdm/2e+2, Rdm/2e+3, ..., Rm};
batch verification (AR1, dm/2e);
batch verification (AR2, m− dm/2e);
if (m == 1 && batch verification (AR, m) != 1) then
returns MR = {IMSIi}
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or malicious and sends bad shares to some of the mobile
recipients. However, our system model has a honest sender
mobile user. But a mobile user participant who lies about
his share can cause reconstructing incorrect value of the
secret (hash of SIMcode) at the server. Our scheme is a
fault-tolerant scheme that allows the hash of SIMcode to
be correctly reconstructed, even in the presence of a certain
number of corrupted shares.
We propose an algorithm to detect malicious requests
of the MSi in a batch in at most log m verification rounds
(O(log m)). The proposed algorithm, based on binary search
approach, is explained as Algorithm 1. Only the hash-based
search complexity is better than binary search. The hash-
based searching is useful when you know the data, and
even more efficient when the data is in sorted order (O(1)).
However, in our protocol, the AS neither knows the actual
data nor stores any data until it is verified. In such case, the
proposed algorithm for malicious detection is suitable. Note
that “batch verification (AR, m)” is the batch verification
process at the AS involving P , R, and Yi as explained in our
protocol. Each invalid MSi is placed on a black-list and can
only be removed once the predefined time is over. During
this period, the request from particular MSi is discarded.
More generally, if there can be t malicious users with
faked shares (S-Actcode
′
i, i = 1, 2, ..., t), we can show that the
secret can be recovered and the malicious users identified
if k + 2t shares are available for reconstruction. In other
words, we need at least k + t honest shares available (in
addition to the t possible malicious users) in order to recover
the secret (hash of SIMcode) and identify the malicious
users. We assume that there are t cheaters or malicious
users participating at any time, where t ≤ k/2. In any
secret sharing cheater or malicious identification scheme,
the optimal cheating threshold is k = 2t + 1. In [63], it is
shown that in any such scheme, the following lower bound
must be satisfied: |V | ≥ (|S−Actcode|−1)/+1, where |V |
exactly matches the above bound is said to be optimal. Let
k = 2t+1, p = 1/ and |S−Actcode| = pi, where i > 1 and
S−Actcode = (S−Actcode1, S−Actcode2, ..., S−Actcodei)
is a shared secret. We can identify up to t malicious users
such that |V | = |S − Actcode|/3n [64]. Now, we assume
that j (n ≥ j ≥ t) number of participants are involved in a
secret reconstruction out of n. Then, we have j−t legitimate
shares in a secret reconstruction. When j − t > t (j ≥ t+1),
there are
(j−t
t
)
cases that will construct the legitimate secret
[65]. This attack of not being able to reconstruct the secret
succeeds only when j − t < t.
Proposition 3. There is a sustainable impact of mobility when
a user moves out of range of the home AS.
One of the challenges of the cellular networks is to
provide a reliable and secure service to a mobile user when
he/she moves to a roaming area. The proposed protocol
works only if the AS receives at least k messages from
the participated users. It is also assumed that the ASs
are deployed at different geographic locations similar to
traditional cellular networks, and are interconnected to each
other with a pre-shared secret key between each pair of
the ASs. When a roaming mobile user requests for an
SMS service, the corresponding AS of that area handles
the request, and sends the request message encrypted with
pre-shared key to the home AS of the user. The protocol
execution takes place at the home AS and the result is
returned securely to the roaming AS securely. Finally, the
roaming AS grants/revokes SMS service to the respective
mobile user. Also, if one or more MSs are out of network,
the AS will verify whether it has received at least k messages
from different MSs. If it holds, the AS proceeds, otherwise
the AS waits for a timeout period. If the AS still does not
receive k messages, it discards the connections, and notifies
the sender MS to restart its request.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section describes provable security of the proposed
protocol by achieves the security goals outlined in Section
2.2 along with a formal verification of the proposed protocol.
Provable security aims to give an guarantee that the pro-
posed protocol is secure under a system model (described
in Section 2.1) and cannot be broken by a class of adversaries
under a threat model (described in Section 2.2).
The proposed protocol will not affect network and ser-
vice control compliances with the relevant regulation in
different countries with respect to spam and marketing. A
sender can only send an SMS to a receiver if the receiver
already agreed to participate and the identities of both
users are verified by the authentication server. In most of
these services, the recipient knows the actual mobile number
(individual or service number) of the sender. The proposed
protocol hides the actual identity of each user over the net-
work. Hence, it is unlikely that spam messages could be sent
using this protocol. This section further analyses different
security properties fulfilled by the proposed protocol.
Property 1. Mutual Authentication. The proposed protocol
provides mutual authentication between all MS/MSi and the AS.
The BVPSMS protocol provides mutual authentication
between the AS and the MS, and between the AS and the
MSi. The AS authenticates all MSi by verifying
∑m
i=1(Yi
?
=
R) while each MSi authenticates the AS by comparing Pi
?
=
P
′
i . The sender MS authenticates the AS by decrypting the
received message-3 using DK1 while the MS is authenticated
by the AS by verifying Tm+1.
MS |≡MSi |≡ AS →MS |≡MSi ∧MS |≡ AS.
Property 2. Secure Session Keys. The protocol initiates a
secure session key establishment between all MS/MSi and the AS.
In fact, Adversary A will not be successful in obtaining SK1/SKi
or DK1/DKi key, even if it captures S-Actcodei/Actcodei of a MS.
A unique DKi key is used within the expiry of a session
for each authentication between the AS and each MSi. A
is unable to generate DK1/DKi key as it does not know
the SKi key and the key generation function f1(). Since
each S-Actcodei/Actcodei is sent over the network only once,
the protocol is secure even if A is able to capture S-
Actcodei/Actcodei. Moreover, A cannot derive any relation
among captured S-Actcodei/Actcodei, as SIMcode1/SIMcodei
are randomly generated at the AS. Moreover, after each
authentication, new-SIMcode1/new-SIMcodei are sent to each
involved MS/MSi. If A modifies Actcodei in message-2, the
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computed MAC2
′
i will not match with the received MAC2i
at the AS. Hence, the MSi will terminate the connection.
Property 3. User Privacy. Adversary A cannot trace the
original identity of the MS/MSi. In fact, A is not able to identify
the actual user, even if it captures the TID1/TIDi of a mobile user.
If adversary A is able to retrieve the original identity
(IMSI) of a user, it can perform an impersonation and
session hijacking attacks [66]. Our protocol preserves iden-
tity anonymity and untraceability properties. The user’s
anonymity and untraceability guarantee that besides the
user and the AS ∈{networks}, no one including the oper-
ator: (i) can retrieve the actual identity of the user, and (ii) is
able to identify previous sessions involving that user.
Untraceability: Our protocol satisfies untraceability as A
cannot distinguish whether two TIDs correspond to the
same MS/MSi or two different MS/MSi.
Verify(publicChannel)[(IMSI1, IMSI2)|TIDi|MS/MSi|AS]
≈ Verify(publicChannel)[IMSI1|IMSI2|TIDi|MS/MSi|AS].
In our protocol, privacy of each MSi (including MS) is
ensured. Each TIDi is computed from the original IMSIi as
TIDi = f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi before a message is sent by each MSi
over the network. We implement f2() using AES-CTR with
DKi key since no practical full attack has revealed against
on AES. As TIDi is used by each MSi over the network, A
is unable to trace the original identity of the user.
Indistinguishability under Anonymous Identity: Our proto-
col is indistinguishable under anonymous identity as no
adversary A at time t can distinguish between two chosen
identities TID1 and TID2 with a negligible  advantage.
Pr[A(TID1) = 1]− Pr[A(TID2) = 1] ≤ .
A cannot distinguish and relate TIDi and other messages
with IDi, as each TIDi is used only once over the network.
For all subsequent requests, a different new-ReqNoi is used
each time when the sender MS connects to the MSi. The
MSi sends an encrypted new-ReqNoi to the MS that will be
used for the next authentication within a session. Hence,
untraceability and identity anonymity are ensured, as A
cannot trace TIDi, SIMcodei, and new-ReqNo to link with
users, and also IMSIi would not be revealed to A and
intermediate operators.
Property 4. Defeating Linkability and IND-CPA At-
tacks. A cannot link current session information with previous
sessions. Our protocol maintains perfect forward secrecy and
Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA).
The protocol achieves fairness and guarantees that “no MSi (mali-
cious or legitimate) has an advantage” and maintains correctness
under honest, semi-honest, and dishonest majority scenarios.
The MSi (including MS) and the AS generate fresh DKi
keys with unique timestamps, TIDi, Actcodei and Ki. There-
fore, A cannot retrieve the information based on linkability.
Forward Secrecy: Our protocol maintains forward secrecy
as no A could obtain past keys and generate future keys.
The SKi and DKi keys are never sent over the network,
and a new DKi key is used in each fresh session to encrypt
IMSIi using AES-CTR. Even compromising current DKi will
not allow A to obtain or generate past and future keys.
Also, the past keys cannot be used for future sessions, as
endpoints generate a fresh DKi key.
IND-CPA: Our protocol is IND-CPA secure as no adver-
sary A in time t can distinguish between two chosen mes-
sages msg1 and msg2, and has no or negligible advantage.
Pr
DKi←SKi
[A(msg1) = 1]− Pr
DKi←SKi
[A(msg2) = 1] ≤ .
Assuming that A has unlimited access to the encrypted
data using a random oracle, the messages encrypted by
the same key in our protocol generate different ciphertexts.
Even encrypting the same plaintext with the same key
generates different ciphertext, as at least one of the input
parameters of the message is always different. The MSi
generates TIDi as f2(IMSIi, Ti)DKi , where Ti changes for
each fresh message. We use AES-CTR as f2() that encrypts
successive values of a counter with AES, and regurgitates
concatenation of the encrypted blocks. AES-CTR stream
never includes twice the same block and is IND-CPA.
A protocol is said to be fair if it ensures that no user can
gain a significant advantage over other users, even if the
protocol halts for any reason. In our protocol, the MS/MSi
and the AS learn each others’ information. However, the MS
and the MSi cannot learn any information about each other,
as one user is unable to obtain DKi keys belonging to other
users. Users are also unable to derive IMSIi/TIDi of each
others, as each DKi is secret. Also,A cannot generate a valid
symmetric-signature Si, as it does not know the correct SKi
and/or DKi keys, and Ki is randomly generated by each
MSi. Our protocol also maintains IND-CPA; therefore, no
MSi has an advantage over others. The proposed protocol
fairly works under all three scenarios. We consider these
scenarios only for the MSi, not for the AS. The reason is that
the AS keeps SKi keys of all MSi secret. Hence, it cannot be
dishonest or semi-dishonest. The effectiveness of our proto-
col under all three scenarios can be observed by re-batch
verification time discussed in Section 6.2.3. Our protocol
maintains security properties under these scenarios, such
as IND-CPA, forward secrecy and fairness.
Property 5. Defeating Other Security Attacks. Our pro-
tocol defeats SMS disclosure, SMS spoofing, replay, MITM, and
impersonation attacks between the MS/MSi and the AS. The pro-
tocol provides security protection over-the-air and SS7 channel.
A cannot compromise message confidentiality and integrity. The
protocol is secure against both passive and active corruption at-
tacks in the presence of non-adaptive and/or adaptive adversaries.
BVPSMS provides mutual authentication between the
AS and the MS/MSi by verifying (
∑m
i=1Xi)
?
= R, and
Pi
?
= P
′
i . It prevents the system against impersonation
attack. Transmitted messages are securely encrypted using
AES-CTR, which protects the system against SMS disclosure
and MITM attacks. A is unable capture actual IMSI using
IMSI catcher as each MS/MSi sends its TID over the net-
work. It also prevents SMS spoofing as A cannot imperson-
ate the server as a legitimate user because TID changes each
time a user communicates. Furthermore, a timestamp value
sent with each message protects the system against replay
attack. Our protocol provides end-to-end SMS security from
the MS to all MSi over OTA interface and SS7 channel,
as each confidential message is encrypted using AES-CTR
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, XXXX 2017 11
TABLE 2: Protocols Comparison
Prevention Goals ABAKA
[14]
RAISE
[12]
SPECS
[17]
b-SPECS+
[15]
BVPSMS
Mutual Authenti-
cation
Yes No Yes Yes Yes
User Privacy Yes Yes No No Yes
Integrity
Protection
No Yes No No Yes
Replay Attack Yes Yes No No Yes
MITM Attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Impersonation
Attack
Yes Partial No Yes Yes
with a 128-bit key. Moreover, message integrity (message
content and its threshold delivery in time) is maintained,
as Treceive ≤ Tgenerate + Tthreshold and MACs are used for
verification and the messages received after will be lapsed.
In passive and active corruption attacks, A obtains com-
plete information held by the corrupted MSi (while a MSi
still runs protocol correctly) and A takes over control of
corrupted MSi, respectively. In both cases, our protocol
maintains IND-CPA indistinguishability as well as perfect
forward secrecy. Moreover, keys are never sent over the
network, and delegation keys are generated only for a
session. Furthermore, both passive and active adversaries
can be non-adaptive (a set of corrupted MSi is chosen before
the protocol starts) or adaptive (a corrupted MSi is selected
at any time during protocol run). In any case, A acting as
corrupted MSi does not affect the security of the protocol.
Table 2 lists the security and privacy requirements
achieved by the existing protocols. These protocols are
secure against MITM attack, but do not provide integrity
protection to the messages with the exception of RAISE [12].
However, RAISE [12] does not provide mutual authenti-
cation and is only partially secure against impersonation
attacks. We observe that user privacy is preserved in ABAKA
[14] and RAISE [12], but both SPECS [17] and b-SPECS+ [15]
suffer from replay attack. Our proposed protocol, on the
other hand, fulfills all the mentioned requirements.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the performance evaluation of
BVPSMS in terms of overheads, verification and re-batch
verification times, and the time, space, and cost analysis.
6.1 Analysis
This subsection analyzes the performance of the BVPSMS
protocol. We compare the communication overhead gen-
erated by RAISE [12], ABAKA [14], SPECS [17], and b-
SPECS+ [15] along with the BVPSMS protocol. There is no
batch protocol for SMS security in the literature. However,
we compare the communication overhead generated by
the protocols with our protocol, as all protocols are based
on authentication considering the same wireless network
communication scenario, and also the flow of information is
same in all the protocols. However, the computation over-
head and verification delay are different in both types of the
protocols because VANET protocols have additional devices
and road side equipment to communicate information over
the network.
6.1.1 Communication Overhead
Let m be the number of recipients MSi, and r be the number
of subsequent multiple authentication requests within the
expiry time, i.e., ExpT. The communication overhead can be
defined as the total number of bits transmitted during the
authentication process over the network. The transmission
overhead generated by the BVPSMS protocol during m-
authentication requests can be evaluated as:
Phase-1: Total number of transmitted bits = (1)+(2)+
(3)+(4)+(5)+(6) = (128+64+8+64+64)×m + (128+64+8+64+
64+128+64+128+128+64+64)×m + (64+64+8) + (64) + (128+
64+64+8+64+64+128)×m + (8+64+64) = 336+1752×m bits.
Phase-2: Total number of transmitted bits = ((7)+(8))×r =
(128+8+64)×r + (64+8)×r = 200×r.
Total overhead = 42+(219×m)+(25×r) bytes.
BVPSMS is our original protocol that provides integrity
to each message in two phases. Since all the protocols except
RAISE [12] compared in Table 3 provide no integrity, we
use two variants of BVPSMS for comparison: BVPSMS∗
for fresh authentication without integrity protection (as
phase-1), and BVPSMS∗∗ for each subsequent authentica-
tion within the expiry time of DK1 key (as phase-2). For m-
authentication requests, BVPSMS∗ generates 154×m bytes
overhead, which is lowest among all the protocols discussed
in the paper, while for all subsequent authentication re-
quests, the overhead is only 34×r bytes.
From Figure 5, it is clear that BVPSMS∗ and BVPSMS∗∗
generate less communication overhead among all proto-
cols. BVPSMS∗ reduces the communication overhead by
6.1%, 23%, 12.5%, and 46.52% in comparison to ABAKA,
RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+, respectively, when m = 5,
10, 20, 50, 100. For any subsequent authentication request,
BVPSMS∗∗ produces significantly low overhead in compar-
ison to all the protocols. It reduces the communication over-
head by 79.27%, 89.83%, 80.69%, and 88.2% in comparison to
ABAKA, RAISE, SPECS, and b-SPECS+, respectively, when
r = 5, 10, 20, 50, 100.
In the proposed protocol, the receiver MS will not be
liable for any cost. Only the sender MS will pay the cost
for sending the SMSs. Technically, there is no limitation of
sending or receiving SMSs in the modern cellular infras-
tructure, assuming the upload and download data speeds
TABLE 3: Communication Overhead in Batch Authentica-
tion by Different Protocols
Protocols Device-
Server
(bytes)
Intermediate
Authority
Server (bytes)
Server-
Device
(bytes)
Total
(bytes)
ABAKA [14] 84×m – 80×m 164×m
RAISE [12] 200×m – – 200×m
SPECS [17] 48×m 96×m 32×m 176×m
b-SPECS+ [15] 48×m 176×m 64×m 288×m
BVPSMS∗ 97×m – 57×m 154×m
BVPSMS∗∗ 25×r 9×r – 34×r
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Fig. 5: Communication overhead analysis.
are sufficiently fast. For example, 4G LTE offers typical
download and upload speeds of 14Mbps and 8Mbps, re-
spectively, whereas 4G LTE-Advanced provides typical real
world download speeds of 42Mbps and upload speeds of
30Mbps [67]. At the time of this research, voice over LTE
provides the fastest platform for sending an SMS [68].
The proposed protocol is efficient and practical as long as
the authentication server is able to handle a batch process
efficiently. The delivery of each SMS is handled by the SMS
center, which keeps any undelivered SMS for 24 hours.
Practically, it can handle a very large number of undelivered
SMSs in the system.
6.1.2 Computation Overhead
The computation overhead generated by BVPSMS during
m-authentication requests is shown in Table 4. We consider
all functions as a single unit cost. Then, the computations at
the MS, MSi, and AS are as follows:
Phase-1: At MS = 8, MSi = 11×m, and AS = 6+14×m.
Phase-2: At MS = 2×r and MSi = 2×r.
Total computation overhead = 8 + (11×m) + (6+14×m) +
(2×r) + (2×r) = 14+(25×m)+(4×r) bits.
We compute the communication and computation over-
heads (in bits) generated by our protocol when m = 10,
20, 50, 100; r = 1, 2, 5, 10. For m=100, the generated
TABLE 4: Computation Overhead in Batch Authentication
Entity Name Total Computation (Time Computation)
Phase-1
At the MS Tf1(), Tf2(), 2TD{}DK1 , TE{}DK , Tf3(), TH(), TS-Actcode
At the MSi mTf1(), mTf2(), 3mTXOR, mTAdd, mTD{}DK ,
2mTf3(), mTActcode, mTH()
At the AS (m+ 1)Tf1(), (m+ 1)Tf2(), (m+ 1)TH(), 3mTf3(),
(3m− 3)TAdd, TSub, (2m+ 1)TXOR, (m+ 2)TE{}DK ,
TD{}DK , (m+ 1)TSIMcode
Phase-2
At the MS rTE{}DK , rTD{}DK
At the MSi rTD{}DK , rTE{}DK
communication overheads are 2745.875 bytes and 2970.875
bytes, respectively, when r=1 and r=10. Similarly, when
m=100, the computation overheads for r=1 and r=10 are
314.75 bytes and 319.25 bytes, respectively. The computation
overhead of the proposed protocol is much lower than the
communication overhead, therefore, the proposed protocol
achieves lightweight computations and can support a large
number of mobile users to be authenticated in a batch. This
also indicates that our protocol is efficient even when a large
number of subsequent requests is executed.
6.2 Simulation
This section presents the simulation results of our protocol
in terms of the total execution and verification times. We
also perform time, space, and cost analysis of our protocol.
6.2.1 Protocol Execution Time
We implemented a client-server paradigm for our system,
where the MS/MSi are the clients and the AS is a server.
We performed various operations on an Intel Core i3-2330M
2.20GHz machine with Windows7 OS, 256 MB RAM, using
JDK1.7 with J2ME WTK mobile emulator. On average, the
execution time to perform addition, XOR, and subtraction
are Tadd = 0.0009 milliseconds (ms), Txor = 0.03 ms, and
Tsub = 0.0009 ms, respectively. We setup the system with 50
MSi (and one MS) transmitting their messages to the server
AS, when the MS sends an SMS to these MSi. The average
value of 30 iterations is considered for each result.
Note that protocol execution time is the complete time
for mutual authentication between all MS/MSi and the AS.
Table 5 shows our simulation results obtained for various
functions’ computations. Here, Ext, TUM, Enc, and Dec
are the execution time (ms), total used memory (bytes),
encryption, and decryption process, respectively. The f2()
is implemented as AES-CTR, where encryption (generation
of TIDi) took 13.6 ms and decryption (generation of IMSIi)
is performed in 4.2 ms. The AES is a secure algorithm till
date and CTR mode provide parallelism to speed up the ex-
ecution. The same results are obtained for E{}DK1/D{}DK1
using AES-CTR. The f1() and f3() are implemented as
HMACSHA-256 and HMAC-SHA1, respectively. The output
of HMAC-SHA1 and HMACSHA-256 are truncated to 64 and
128 bits, respectively because the output of f3() is 64 bits
MAC, whereas the output of f1() is 128 bits, which is DKi
key. The input to the HAMCSHA1 and HMACSHA-256 are
512 bits each (actual input size plus trailing zeros to make it
multiple of 512). Also, the execution time of SIMcode using
a random number generation and hash generation time of
H() using SHA256 are 0.89 ms and 20 ms, respectively.
TABLE 5: Computations of Various Used Functions
Function ExT (ms) TUM (bytes)
f1()=HMACSHA-256 185 15204024
E{}DK1/f2()=AES-CTR 13.6 9139681
D{}DK1/f2()=AES-CTR 4.2 9124165
f3()=HMAC-SHA1 172 15211840
H()=SHA256 20 14321156
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Total execution time of a single authentication:
Phase-1: Total time = transmission time for all messages in
phase-1 + time at the entities (MS, MSi, AS) = 2.98 sec.
Hence, on average the execution time per user = 1.49 sec.
Phase-2: Total time = transmission time for all messages in
phase-2 + time at the MS, MSi, AS = 10.7+35.6 = 46.3 ms.
Total execution time of a batch authentication:
Phase-1: Total time = transmission time for all messages in
phase-1 + time at the MS, MSi, AS = 672.20+m×1330.41 ms.
Phase-2: Total time = transmission time for all messages in
phase-2 + time at the MS, MSi, AS = r×46.3 ms.
6.2.2 Verification Time
The verification delay in our protocol is evaluated between
the MS/MSi and the AS. It is the time estimation between
the sent messages and the received response or the protocol
completion.
BVPSMS Phase-1 (Time to verify): MSi by AS =
0.0282+391.55×m ms, MS by AS = 236.40+172.89×m ms, AS
by MSi = 172.03×m ms, and AS by MS 4.2 ms.
Total delay in phase-1 = 240.62+736.47×m ms.
BVPSMS Phase-2 (Time to verify): MS by MSi = 17.8×r ms,
and MSi by MS 4.2×r ms.
Total verification delay in phase-2 = 32×r ms.
Therefore, total verification delay in BVPSMS =
240.62+736.47×m+32×r ms.
6.2.3 Re-batch Verification Time
If a batch authentication is not successful, it is expected
to execute a re-batch authentication without including
the malicious MSi. After detecting the malicious MSi, it
is required to remove them from the batch and execute
a re-batch authentication process. The delay in re-batch
verification can be estimated as follows:
Total delay in a re-batch verification = 0.000933×3(m−1−t)
+ 0.030322 + 0.000933 = 0.028456+0.002799×(m− t) ms.
6.2.4 Simulation Results
The execution time of the BVPSMS protocol is observed
when m = 10, 20, 50, 100; r = 1, 2, 5, 10. For m=100, the
protocol execution times are 133.75 sec. and 134.17 sec.,
respectively, when r=1 and r=10, which are actually on
average, 1.32 sec. and 1.21 sec. per user, respectively. It is
clear that on average, the execution time per mobile user
decreases when r increases. The execution time per mobile
user also decreases when m increases and r is fixed. On
average, the execution times of our protocol are 1.44, 1.38,
1.35, and 1.34 sec., respectively, when r=10 (fix) and m=10,
20, 50, and 100. The verification times for phase-1 and phase-
2 of our protocol are also evaluated when m = 10, 20, 50,
100 and r = 1, 2, 5, 10, 50. For m=100, on average the
verification time per user for batch authentication is 0.71
sec. Furthermore, for r=10 and r=50, the total verification
times are 0.3 sec. and 1.6 sec., respectively, and on average,
the verification time for each subsequent authentication
per user is 0.03 sec. It is also clear that the increase in r
lowers verification time, on average per mobile user. Re-
batch verification time is also computed in our protocol
when m = 10, 20, 50, 100 and malicious requests t = 2, 4,
6, 8, 10. For m=10, the re-batch verification times are 0.044
ms, 0.03 ms, and 0.028 ms, respectively, when t=2, t=9, and
t=10. Similarly, for m=100, the times are 0.22 ms, 0.21 ms,
and 0.20 ms, respectively, when t=2, t=9, and t=10.
6.3 Time, Space, and Cost Analysis
In both single and batch authentications, two functions f3()
and f1() are implemented as HMAC functions. The output
of HMAC-SHA1 and HMACSHA-256 are 160 bits and 256
bits, respectively. The DK key requires 128 from 256 bits and
a MAC needs 64 out of 160 bits. In total, 192 bits are required
to be stored. Furthermore, the time complexity of add,
subtract, and XOR operations are constant, i.e., O(1). The
costs for a single authentication (8 operations) and a batch
authentication (9×m− 1 operations) are also O(1). The time
to compute Actcode/SIMcode is constant, and total cost is
O(1). The block cipher algorithm, such as AES, works with a
fixed input size and has O(1) constant complexity. However,
when the algorithm has variable length of input (say |m|),
the time is O(m). The block size is still fixed (128 bits) as
the f2() and E/D{}DK1 are implemented using AES-CTR.
Therefore, the time complexity is independent of input and
is constant O(1). Hence, the costs are O(1) for f2() and
E/D{}DK1 in a single authentication (2 operations) as well
as batch authentication (2×m operations). The IMSIi and
TIDi of 128 bits each also need to be stored in the memory.
Furthermore, the storage is also required for HMAC-SHA1,
HMACSHA-256, and AES-CTR at the MS/MSi as well as at
the AS. For a re-batch verification, O(1) is only the extra cost
need to be paid (for 3×m-3×t+2 operations). Therefore, the
BVPSMS protocol is an efficient, secure, and cost effective
protocol that requires less storage.
7 CONCLUSION
We proposed a batch verification protocol BVPSMS for
transmitting secure SMS from one MS to multiple MS
recipients. This protocol enjoys several advantages over
the related protocols studied in the paper. BVPSMS pro-
vides mutual authentication between each MS and the AS.
The AS efficiently verifies multiple authentication requests
sent by different MSs at any one time while keeping the
original IMSI secret during the authentication. We then
demonstrated that the protocol is secure against replay
attacks, MITM attacks, impersonation attacks, SMS disclo-
sure and SMS spoofing, and also maintains untraceability,
forward secrecy, and identity anonymity. The performance
results show that in different scenarios, i.e., BVPSMS∗ and
BVPSMS∗∗ when no provision of integrity protection, our
protocol incurs a lower communication overhead compared
to the protocols studied in this paper. Our evaluation of
the protocol using Java demonstrated that the estimated re-
batch verification time is almost negligible. The execution
and verification times also suggested that our protocol is
practical for deployment in real-world cellular networks.
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APPENDIX A
FORMAL VERIFICATION
This section presents the formal proof of the proposed
scheme using Proverif. Proverif is an online automated tool
to verify whether the logical expressions and the protocol
properties are correct and valid with different queries. We
perform five A queries: (i) Can A successfully recover
confidential and useful information from the messages
sent over the network?, (ii) Can A successfully compute
parameters generated by the MS?, (iii) Can A successfully
compute parameters generated by the AS?, (iv) Can A
successfully generate DK key of the MS?, and (v) Can A
successfully recover secret key of the MS?. Following is the
syntax and output observed from the Proverif tool:
Neetesh@Neetesh− PC /proverif1.88
$./proverif proofs/sms/BV PSMS.pv
free PubChannel: channel.
type host. type nonce. type skey. type sskey. type ident.
(* 3 honest host names MS, MSi and AS *)
free MS, MSi, AS : host.
(* Shared key encryption *)
fun sencrypt(bitstring,sskey): bitstring.
reduc forall x:bitstring, y:sskey; sdecrypt(sencrypt(x,y),y) = x.
fun sencrypttime(bitstring,sskey): nonce.
reduc forall x:nonce, y:sskey; sdecrypttime(sencrypt(x,y),y) = x.
(* Secrecy assumptions *)
not attacker(new DKms1). not attacker(new DKmsi).
(* the table host names/keys *)
table keys(host, sskey).
(* Hash function *)
fun H(bitstring):bitstring.
(* MAC functions *)
fun mac1f3(nonce,bitstring,ident,bitstring): mac.
fun mac2f3(nonce,bitstring,ident,bitstring,nonce,ident,
bitstring,bitstring,bitstring): mac.
fun mac3f3(nonce,nonce,bitstring,bitstring,bitstring,
bitstring): mac.
(* Other function *)
fun f(bitstring): bitstring.
fun f1(nonce,skey): sskey.
fun f2(ident,nonce,sskey): ident.
fun f7(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun f8(bitstring,sskey,bitstring): bitstring.
fun f9(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun f10(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun f11(bitstring,ident): bitstring.
fun f12(sskey,ident): bitstring.
fun f13(bitstring,ident): bitstring.
fun f21(bitstring,bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
fun f22(bitstring,bitstring): bitstring.
(* Queries *)
event beginMSi(host, host).
event endMSi(host, host).
event beginMS(host, host).
event endMS(host, host).
event beginMSfull(host, host, nonce).
event endMSfull(host, host, nonce).
query x: host, y: host; inj-event(endMS(x,y)) ==>
inj-event(beginMS(x,y)).
query x: host, y: host, z: nonce; inj-event(endMSfull(x,y,z)) ==> inj-
event(beginMSfull(x,y,z)).
(* MS *)
let processMS =
in(PubChannel, (xA1: host, xB1: host));
if xA1 = MS xB1 = MS then
new imsims1:ident; new skms1:skey; get keys(=MS, skms1) in
let DKms1:sskey = f1(tims1,skms1) in
insert keys(MS,DKms1);
new tims1:nonce; new simcode1:bitstring;
let tidms1:ident = f2(imsims1,tims1,DKms1) in
new rno:bitstring; new q:bitstring; new i:bitstring;
let fofi:bitstring = f(i) in
let s-actcodei:bitstring = f21(i,fofi,q) in
let mac1ms1:mac = mac1f3(tims1,rno,tidms1,s-actcodei) in
event begMS(MS, MSi);
out(pubChannel,(MSG1,tims1,rno,tidms1,s-actcodei,mac1ms1));
in(pubChannel,(=MSG3,enctm1ms1:nonce,enctexpms1:nonce));
let dectexpms1:nonce = sdecrypttime(enctexpms1,DKms1);
event beginMSfull(MS, AS, enctm1ms1);
out(pubChannel,(MSG4,enctm1ms1));
in(pubChannel,(=MSG6,encnewrnoms1:bitstring,
encnewsimcode1:bitstring,enct1ms1:bitstring);
let dect1ms1:bitstring = sdecrypt(enct1ms1,DKms1) in
if (dect1ms1 = tims1) then
event endMSfull(AS, MS, enctm1ms1);
event endMSfull(AS, MS, enct1ms1);
(* MSi *)
let processMSi =
in(PubChannel, (xA2: host, xB2: host));
if xA2 = MSi xB2 = MSi then
in(pubChannel,(=MSG1,tims1msi:nonce,rnomsi:bitstring, tidms1msi:ident, s-
actcodeimsi: bitstring, mac1ms1msi:mac));
new timsi:nonce; new simcodei:bitstring; new ki:bitstring;
new imsimsi:ident; new skmsi:skey; get keys(=MSi, skmsi) in
let DKmsi:sskey = f1(timsi,skmsi) in
insert keys(MSi,DKmsi);
let tidmsi:ident = f2(imsimsi,timsi,DKmsi) in
let actcodei:bitstring = H(simcodei) in
let mac1ms1msi2:mac = mac1f3(tims1msi,rnomsi,tidms1msi, s-actcodeimsi) in
if (mac1ms1msi = mac1ms1msi2) then
let mac2msi:mac = mac2f3(tims1msi,rnomsi,tidms1msi,
s-actcodeimsi,timsi,tidmsi,yi,zi,actcodei) in
let yi:bitstring = f13(ki,imsimsi) in
let zi:bitstring = f8(ki,DKmsi,rnomsi) in
event begMSi(MSi, AS);
out(pubChannel,(MSG2,MSG1,timsi,tidmsi,yi,zi,actcodei,
mac2msi));
in(pubChannel,(=MSG5,enctm2msi:nonce,enctexpmsi:nonce,
encnewrnomsi:bitstring,encnewsimcodeimsi:bitstring,
encDKms1asmsi:bitstring,pimsi:bitstring,mac3iasmsi:nonce));
let mac3imsi:mac = mac3f3(enctm2msi,enctexpmsi,
encnewrnomsi,encnewsimcodeimsi,encDkms1asmsi,pimsi) in
if (mac3iasmsi = mac3imsi) then
let pimsi2:bitstring = f12(DKmsi,imsimsi) in
if(pimsi2 = pimsi) then
let dectm2msi:nonce = decrypttime(enctm2msi,DKmsi);
let dectexpmsi:nonce = decrypttime(enctexpmsi,DKmsi);
let decnewrnomsi:bitstring = decrypt(encnewrnomsi,DKmsi);
let decnewsimcodeimsi:bitstring =
decrypt(encnewsimcodeimsi,DKmsi);
let decDKms1asmsi:bitstring =
decrypt(encDKms1asmsi,DKmsi);
event endMS(MS, MSi);
event endMSifull(AS, MSi, enctexpmsi);
(* AS *)
let processAS =
in(PubChannel, (xA3: host, xB3: host));
if xA3 = AS xB3 = AS then
in(pubChannel,(=MSG2,MSG1:bitstring,timsias:nonce,
tidmsias:ident,yias:bitstring,zias:bitstring,actcodeias:bitstring,
mac2msias:mac));
mac2msias2:mac = mac2f3(MSG1,timsias,tidmsias,yias,zias,
actcodeias,mac2msias);
if (mac2msias2 = mac2msias) then
new skms1as:skey; new skmsias:skey;
new simcodeias:bitstring;
let actcodeias2:bitstring = H(simcodeias);
if (actcodeias2 = actcodeias) then
new k:bitstring;
let simcode1as:bitstring = f22(s-actcodeimsi,k) in
get keys(=MS, skms1as) in
get keys(=MSi, skmsias) in
let DKms1as:sskey = f1(tims1msi,skms1as) in
let DKmsias:sskey = f1(timsias,skmsias) in
let imsims1:ident = f2(tidms1,tims1msi,DKms1as) in
let imsimsi:ident = f2(tidmsi,timsias,DKmsias) in
insert keys(MS,DKms1as); insert keys(MSi,DKmsias);
new ki:bitstring; new m:bitstring;
let pias:bitstring = f12(DKmsias,imsimsi) in
let p:bitstring = f9(pias,m) in
let r1:bitstring = f7(rnomsi,p) in
let r2:bitstring = f11(zias,imsimsi) in
let r3:bitsting = f9(r2,m) in
let r:bitstring = f10(r3,r1) in
let q:bitstring = f9(yias,m) in
new tm1as:nonce; new texpas:nonce;
if (r = q) then
let enct1ms1:nonce = sencrypttime(tm1as,DKms1as) in
let enctexpas:nonce = sencrypttime(texpas,DKms1as) in
event beginMSfull(AS, MS, enctm1as);
out(pubChannel,(MSG3,enctm1as,enctexpas));
in(pubChannel,(=MSG4,enctm1ms1as:nonce));
if (enctm1ms1as = enctm1as) then
new tm2as:nonce;
new newrno:bitsting;
new newsimcode1:bitstring;
new newsimcodei:bitstring;
let enctm2as:nonce = sencrypttime(tm2as,DKmsias) in
let encnewrnoi:bitstring = sencrypt(newrno,DKmsias) in
let encnewsimcodei:bitstring =
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sencrypt(newsimcodei,DKmsias) in
let encDKms1as:bitstring = sencrypt(Dkms1as,DKmsias) in
let mac3ias:mac = mac3f3(enctm2as,enctexpas,encnewrnoi,
encnewsimcodei,pias) in
event beginMSifull(AS, MSi, enctexpas);
out(pubChannel,(MSG5,enctm2as,enctexpas,encnewrno,
encnewsimcodei,encDKms1as,pias,mac3ias));
let encnewrno1:bitstring = sencrypt(newrno,DKms1as) in
let enct1ms1:nonce = sencrypttime(tims1msi,DKms1as) in
let encnewsimcode1:bitstring =
sencrypt(newsimcode1,DKms1as) in
event beginMSfull(AS, MS, enct1ms1);
out(pubChannel,(MSG6,encnewrno1,encnewsimcode1,
enct1ms1);
event endMSi(MSi, AS);
event endMSfull(MS, AS, enctm1as);
(* Key registration *)
let processK =
in(PubChannel, (h: host, k: skey));
if h <> MS && h <> MSi then insert keys(h,k).
(* Start process *)
process
new skms1:skey; new skmsi:skey;
insert keys(MS,skms1); insert keys(MSi,skmsi);
((!processMS) | (!processMSi) | (!processAS) | (!processK))
Output: −− Query attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc)
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable
attacker(skms1[!1 = v 946])
Starting query attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc)
RESULT attacker(s[]) ==> event(enableEnc) is true.
−− Query event(endMS(x1,x2)) ==> event(begMS(x1,x2))
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable
attacker(skms1[!1 = v 2080])
Starting query event(endMS(x1,x2)) ==> event(begMS(x1,x2))
RESULT event(endMS(x1,x2)) ==> event(begMS(x1,x2)) is true.
−− Query event(endMSi(x1 2500,x2 2501)) ==>
event(begMSi(x1 2500,x2 2501))
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable
attacker(skmsi[!1 = v 3257])
Starting query event(endMSi(x1 2500,x2 2501)) ==>
event(begMSi(x1 2500,x2 2501))
RESULT event(endMSi(x1 2500,x2 2501)) ==>
event(begMSi(x1 2500,x2 2501)) is true.
−− Query not attacker(DK[])
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable
attacker(DKms1[!1 = v 4332])
Starting query not attacker(DK[])
RESULT not attacker(DK[]) is true.
−− Query not attacker(s[])
Completing...ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable
attacker(skms1[!1 = v 5378])
Starting query not attacker(s[])
RESULT not attacker(s[]) is true.
−− Query inj-event(endMSfull(x 1138,y 1139,z)) ==>
inj-event(beginMSfull(x 1138,y 1139,z))
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker(DKms1[])
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker(DKmsi[])
Starting query inj-event(endMSfull(x 1138,y 1139,z)) ==> inj-
event(beginMSfull(x 1138,y 1139,z))
goal reachable: begin(beginMSfull(AS[],MS[], enctm1as[xA3 =
AS[], DKms1as = DKms1[], xB1 = MS[], !1 =
endsid 1191]), enctm1ms1 = enctm1as[xA3 =
AS[], DKms1as = DKms1[], xB1 = MS[], !1 =
endsid 1191], DKms1 = DKms1as[], xB1 = MS[], xA3 =
AS[],@sid = @sid 1192,@occ11 = @occ cst)− >
end(endsid 1191, endMSfull(AS[],MS[], enctm1as[xA3 =
AS[], DKms1as = DKms1[], xB1 =MS[], !1 = endsid 1191]))
RESULT inj-event(endMSfull(x 1138,y 1139,z)) ==>
inj-event(beginMSfull(x 1138,y 1139,z)) is true.
−− Query inj-event(endMS(x 3230,y 3231)) ==>
inj-event(beginMS(x 3230,y 3231))
Completing... ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker(DKms1[])
ok, secrecy assumption verified: fact unreachable attacker(DKmsi[])
Starting query inj-event(endMS(x 3230,y 3231)) ==>
inj-event(beginMS(x 3230,y 3231))
goal reachable: begin(beginMS(AS[],MS[]), enctm1ms1 =
enctm1as[xA3 = AS[], DKms1as = DKms1[], xB1 =
MS[], !1 = endsid 4353], DKms1 = DKms1as[], xB1 =
MS[], xA3 = AS[],@sid = @sid 4354,@occ8 = @occ cst)− >
end(endsid 4353, endMS(AS[],MS[]))
RESULT inj-event(endMS(x 3230,y 3231)) ==>
inj-event(beginMS(x 3230,y 3231)) is true.
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